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Jurisdiction
This court has jurisdiction under Utah Code sections 78A-4-103(2)(a), 103(2)(j).
Statement of Issues, Standard of Review, preservation
Stevens-Henager College filed claims against Eagle 0ate College, Provo College,
and Jana Miller (collectively "Eagle Gate") seeking both injunctive relief and damages
under various legal theories. In short, Eagle Gate engaged in predatory hiring of StevensHenager employees, had those employees steal computer files containing leads for
potential Stevens-Henager students, and then used those leads to increase Eagle Gate's
student population and decrease Stevens-Henager's student population.
Eagle Gate moved for summary judgment on all claims, not on the ground that
Eagle Gate did not engage in the alleged unlawful conduct, but on the sole ground that, as
a matter of law, Stevens-Henager could not provide any evidence that it was damaged as
a result of Eagle Gate's unlawful conduct.
Issue 1: Whether the district court erred in ruling that Stevens-Henager had
provided no evidence of its damages, where Stevens-Henager did not precisely quantify
its damages but did provide evidence that Eagle Gate's condbct caused the following
types of damage: (i) reduced productivity due to lost employees; (ii) costs of hiring and
training less productive employees; (iii) costs of advertising land marketing efforts made
ineffective when student leads were stolen; (iv) effects of reduced morale on numerous
campuses; and (v) lost tuition payments from students who Otherwise would have
attended Stevens-Henager.
Standard of Review: This court reviews a district court's grant of summary
judgment for correctness and views "the facts and all reasonable inferences drawn
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therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party." Orvis v. Johnson, 2008
UT2,1J6, 177P.3d600.
Preservation: Stevens-Henager preserved this issue in its opposition to Eagle
Gate's motion for summary judgment. (R. 3311, 3491, 3693.)
After the summary judgment ruling, the district court entered a number of orders
based upon its summary judgment ruling. If summary judgment was inappropriate, this
court should vacate those subsequent orders.
Issue 2: Whether the district court erred in subsequent rulings that were based, at
least in part, upon its erroneous summary judgment ruling, including (i) dismissing
Stevens-Henager's claim for injunctive relief and attorney fees under the Federal
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act on the ground that a plaintiff must first prove damages
totaling at least $5,000; (ii) granting a motion in limine to preclude Stevens-Henager
from presenting any evidence of damages at trial; and (iii) striking Stevens-Henager's
expert report concerning damages.
Standard of Review: "Since the partial summary judgment set into play the
entire chain of subsequent proceedings, we also reverse all subsequent orders and
judgments and remand the case for trial." McKee v. Williams, 741 P.2d 978, 982 (Utah
Ct.App. 1987).
Preservation: Stevens-Henager preserved these issues in opposing Eagle Gate's
(i) motion for summary judgment on the Federal Computer Fraud and Abuse Act claim,
(ii) motion in limine to preclude Stevens-Henager from presenting any evidence of
damages at trial, and (iii) motion to strike the expert report. (R. 3950, 4292, 4293.)
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Determinative Provisions
R u l e Mi. I (l» r IK: iili I t i i l r n.l "(! Vvil I1 tocedure
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion, memoranda and affidavits shall
be in accordance with Rule 7. The judgment sought shall be rendered if the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law, A summary judgment.
interlocutory in character, may be rendered on the issue of liability alone although there
is a genuine issue as to the amount of damages.
(e) Form of affidavits; further testimony; defense requu« " ~ pporting and
opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as
would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is
competent to testify to the matters stated therein. Sworn or certified copies of all papers
or parts thereof referred to in an affidavit shall be attached thereto or served therewith.
The court may permit affidavits to be supplemented or opposed by depositions, answers
to interrogatories, or further affidavits. When a motion for summary judgment is made
and supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may inot rest upon the mere
allegations or denials of the pleadings, but the response, by affidavits or as otherwise
provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for
trial. Summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against a party failing \o lik
such a response,
Rule 7 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
(c)(3)(A) A memorandum supporting a motion for summary judgment shall
contain a statement of material facts as to which the moving party contends no genuine
issue exists. Each fact shall be separately stated and numbered and supported b\ citation
to relevant materials, such as affidavits or discovery materials. Each fact set forth in ihc
moving party's memorandum is deemed admitted for the purpose of summary judgment
unless controverted by the responding party.
(c)(3)(B) A memoranda
.iwu i<n .ummarv juauineni >i^;, „v,..
a verbatim restatement of each . * m*. mwv ,,, 5 Fc.ri> "s facts that is controverted, and ma>
contain a separate statement ,M additional facts in dispute For each of the moving parts's
facts that is controverted, the opposing party shall provide an explanation of the grounds
for any dispute, supported by citation to relevant materials, such as affidavits or
discovery materials. For any additional facts set forth in the opposing memorandum,
each fact shall be separately stated and numbered and supported by citation to supporting
materials, such as affidavits or discovery materials.
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Statement of the Case
I.

Nature of the Case
This case involves Stevens-Henager's claims against Eagle Gate and others

stemming from Eagle Gate's predatory hiring of Stevens-Henager's employees, those
employees stealing Stevens-Henager's confidential computer files containing leads for
potential students, and Eagle Gate then using those confidential student leads to increase
Eagle Gate's revenues and decrease Stevens-Henager's revenues. This appeal concerns
whether (i) Stevens-Henager provided any evidence of its damages in opposing Eagle
Gate's motion for summary judgment and (ii) if so, whether various subsequent rulings
based upon the entry of summary judgment therefore also should be vacated.
II.

Course of Proceedings and Statement of Facts
The claims relevant to this appeal are directed at Eagle Gate College, Provo

College, and Jana Miller (collectively "Eagle Gate"). In the complaint, Stevens-Henager
sought both injunctive relief and damages for (i) breach of contract; (ii) violation of the
Uniform Trade Secrets Act; (iii) interference with contractual relations; (iv) interference
with prospective economic relations; (v) violation of the Federal Computer Fraud and
Abuse Act; (vi) unfair competition; and (vii) civil conspiracy. (R. 1-30.)
Because the issues on appeal concern whether the district court erred in granting
Eagle Gate's motion for summary judgment, all facts will be construed in the light most
favorable to Stevens-Henager. Orvis v. Johnson, 2008 UT 2, If 6, 177 P.3d 600. In
addition, because Eagle Gate does not dispute liability in its motion for summary
judgment, liability must be assumed. Id Therefore, Stevens-Henager provides only
minimal background on the conduct that gives rise to Eagle Gate's liability.

11146317

4

Sometime in 2003, Eagle Gate executed a predatory hiring scheme targeting
Stevens-Henager employees, ,m l,"l«!«i«« ^'"^'ns-lk'iiiijioi s admissions ui'iiMilliiil, IJIIII i
Miller. (R. 5-6.) Once Ms. Mnlei joined Eagle Gate, she recruited other StevensHenager employees who also inmed Eagle Gate, all in violation ol then employment
c on it! ac ts i ^ it! i Ste \ ei is-I lei lager (R 6 / ) h i addition, Eagle Gate also attempted to steal
Stevens-Henager's Polynesian Program by trying to hire Mosese longi and Trevor Smith,
nJio lira ii (lie ii I oilman sludeiils lien Sle\cns-I lenagei, A Tin" Nh:\ ens-1 lena^er hud spenl
more than $200,000 on recruiting efforts in the Tongan community, Eagle Gate attempted
to recruit these employees to enroll the very students they previously had been recruiting
U»" ^irvms-HenagiT. I H, *"' • X i As a result of the loss of the various employees, StevensHenager had to hire and train ieplacement employees.
A

..

'

•

•

•

.

]

.

.

they illegally accessed Stevens-1 lenauer s computer system, misappropriated Stevens•Lier > student leads, and altered the contact informatioi: i for sti idei it leads c i 11:1: le
Stevens-Henager computer system (e.g., changing the telephone number) to prevent
St vens-Henager from aho contacting those potential students. (R. 7 1 ^ > F a g l e G a t e
ilipni ihnil Ihosi' iiihli in lr.ul in m i inn in'U iliiiijnnil i in l - a g l c d a l e
I

i IIU j

I iiyle (date's IVI iiliNiiii f o r S i i n niiiiry J u d g m e n t
'(Id " I ,u.'k < i.id

the sole ground that Stevens-Henager had failed to "provide evidence of an essential
element of the claims," namely damages. (R. .>

: agle Gate did not move for

luminal's indium nl I I in ni ili ill il ,1 aTfiiii] vMvi >r\ of damages. :- , nstead directed its
motion to all claims on the ground that Stevens-Henager could not prove any damages.

i n i43ir;
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Eagle Gate first argued that Stevens-Henager had failed to provide evidence of its
damages through various discovery mechanisms such as interrogatories and initial
disclosures. (R. 3143-49.) From this, Eagle Gate then concluded that "the lack of any
evidence or computation of damages . . . demonstrates that [Stevens-Henager] cannot
prove any damages." (R. 3155.)
On October 25, 2007, Stevens-Henager opposed the motion for summary
judgment in three ways: (i) pointing out that Stevens-Henager's ability to quantify
definitively some of its damages required information from Eagle Gate (e.g., which of
Eagle Gate's students were recruited from the lead list stolen from Stevens-Henager);
(ii) citing discovery responses that did describe evidence of Stevens-Henager's damages;
and, importantly for purposes of this appeal, (iii) quoting deposition testimony that
outlines Stevens-Henager's damages. (R. 3312-35.) Stevens-Henager argued that the
deposition testimony is sufficient evidence of its damages to preclude summary
judgment.1 (R. 3337.) Stevens-Henager also argued that it would provide an expert
report with a "detailed calculation of its damages" as soon as Eagle Gate provided
documents necessary for that report. (R. 3331, 3337.) While Stevens-Henager
represented that "many" of its damages were "quantifiable only through expert
testimony," it did not represent that expert testimony was required to establish all of its
damages. (R. 3337.) For that reason, the issue this court must resolve is whether the
deposition testimony was sufficient to preclude summary judgment.

1

Under Rule 56(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, summary judgment is
inappropriate if deposition testimony demonstrates a "genuine issue as to any material
fact."
11146317
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Evidence of Stevens-Henager's Damages
. ..t tiqioHiiliiiii lesliiiioin, \na\ ink nil In1, \iv\ tins 1 l l u u ^ / i in «»ppusnijj sinniiMiy

jii ldgment was as follows: Carol Gastiger—President of Stevens-Henager's Provo
Campus—testified that when Eagle Gate engaged in predatory hiring of Stevens-Henager
;: i i ipl ;:»; ees, had tl lose < r« »n1n\ 'pes steal computer files from Stevens-Henager, and then
used those stolen files ,
v ^

: . - -w.-:iaLi;

dermine Stevens-Henager's efforts to recruit new stiJdents

U i ' k T O J '!*.

t l l l o n 111»J l l l l I Illl.llil'S.

I I II II

II I IS •» 11 II I I I ! 1 I (1i IV ill II |1i(l|IIIil,llllHlir

and the money Stevens-Henager spent recruiting that population; and (ii) reduced
productivity from the loss of Stevens-Henager's "Admissions Consultant," where tlle lost
i'( »iisiili('iii( had averaged 8 student recruits per month but her replacement at StevensHenager averaged only 5 student recnlits per month, which resulted in lost tuition dollars
(I

3332-33.)
Vicki Dewsnup—President of Stevens-Henager's Ogden Campus and Regional

Director of Stevens-Henager—testified tl lat Ste\ ens-Henager si iffered "' 'tremendoi is
damage" in (i) the costs of "advertising and marketing" that were ineffecth e when Eagle
Gate misappropriated the student leads the advertising and marketing had generated;
mi I I i Ilii iiii.ibiilih nl S(c\niv-I

IUI.HMT

In nmiih I i( -i 'ihulnil leads becn-w ! ;mle < -:\\

unlawful conduct had left Stevens-Henager withoiit "adequate phone numbers: (iii) the
"damage
Carl Barney—owner of Stevens-Henager—testified that Stevens-Henager had
suffered damages of "many millions of ti ohuc> iruin u - u e "loss of the [student] starts'" "
foi "at least tw c • :)f the campi ises, I}m\ o and Ogden," which Jed to a reduction in "an
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income stream over three or four years;" (ii) having "to rebuild the admissions
department;" and (iii) the "decline in morale." (R. 3334-35.)
On November 5, 2007, Eagle Gate filed its reply memorandum, arguing that
Stevens-Henager still had provided "no evidence of damages." (R. 3483 at 2.) Eagle
Gate argued that the deposition testimony did not create a disputed issue of fact as to
damages because the deposition testimony is "self-serving," or "wholly speculative," or
"vague." (R. 3483 at 8.)
C.

The District Court Grants Eagle Gate's Motion for Summary
Judgment

On January 30, 2008, the district court granted the motion for summary judgment.
(R. 3564.) In its ruling, the court states that "the parties agree that expert testimony is
needed in order to establish damages in this case." (R. 3565.) Of course, StevensHenager had only stated that many—not all—of its damages were "quantifiable only
through expert testimony." (R. 3337.) Thus, at most, Stevens-Henager had noted that
expert testimony would be needed for certain damages.2 (R. 3574:12.)
Moreover, to the extent expert testimony was needed, Stevens-Henager was
precluded from providing an expert report when Eagle Gate provided documents to
Stevens-Henager only 2 days before the expert report deadline, which, in turn, caused
Stevens-Henager to file a motion to extend the expert report deadline. And StevensHenager did not provide an expert report because the district court did not resolve the
motion to extend discovery deadlines until it ruled on the summary judgment motion.

2

In fact, expert testimony is not required here. Even where proximate cause requires
expert testimony, damages do not. Fratto v. Hensley, 2009 UT App 107, ^f 5, 2009 Utah
App. LEXIS 110; Sohm v. Dixie Eve Ctr„ 2007 UT App 235,1f 15, 166 P.3d 614.
11146317
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(R. 3566.) In addition, Stevens-Henager had pending a motion to compel production of
the documents it needed to complete its expert report at the time it filed its motion to
extend the expert report deadline. (R. 3492-98.)
Based upon the mistaken assumption that expert testimony was required for
Stevens-Henager to prove any damages, the district court granted the motion on the
ground that the expert report deadline had passed, and therefore, Stevens-Henager could
not introduce expert testimony to substantiate its damages. (R. 3564-68.) The district
court cited no case law and provided no analysis as to why the deposition testimony does
not create a question of fact concerning damages. (R. 3681.)
On March 25, 2008, Stevens-Henager filed a motion to reconsider the order
granting summary judgment. (R. 3693.) In support of the motion to reconsider, StevensHenager pointed out that it had provided the court ample non-expert testimony of its
damages to preclude summary judgment. (R. 3696.) In addition, Stevens-Henager urged
the court to reinstate its request for injunctive relief, as that relief does not require expert
testimony of damages. (R. 3696.)
On May 12, 2008, the district court granted the motion to reconsider and reinstated
Stevens-Henager's claims to the extent they seek equitable relief instead of damages.
(R. 3988.) However, the district court again assumed that Stevens-Henager could not
prove any damages without an expert, and therefore, declined to vacate its dismissal of
the damage claims because Stevens-Henager had not provided "timely expert reports."
(R. 3987.)

11146317
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D.

The District Court Grants Other Motions Based Upon the Erroneous
Grant of Summary Judgment

On May 30, 2008, the district court granted Eagle Gate's motion to strike the
report of Stevens-Henager's damages expert "[b]ased on the Court's prior rulings,"
including the rulings on Eagle Gate's motion for summary judgment and StevensHenager's motion to reconsider the order granting summary judgment. (R. 3994.) On
August 31, 2009, the district court granted Eagle Gate's motion in limine to exclude any
evidence of monetary damages—a motion necessary only because there is evidence of
monetary damages—on the ground that the remaining prayer for injunctive relief does
not require proof of damages, and therefore, evidence of monetary damages is irrelevant.
(R. 4368.) Also on August 31, 2009, the district court dismissed Stevens-Henager's
claim for injunctive relief and attorney fees under the Federal Computer Fraud and Abuse
Act on the ground that Stevens-Henager could not prove damages totaling at least $5,000,
a prerequisite for equitable relief and an attorney fees award under the Act. (R. 4366.)
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
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Summary of the Argument
The district court erred in granting summary judgment on the ground that StevensHenager had provided no evidence of its damages. In fact, Stevens-Henager provided
deposition testimony from three witnesses that demonstrates how Stevens-Henager
suffered damages when Eagle Gate engaged in predatory hiring of Stevens-Henager
employees, had those employees steal computer files containing leads for potential
Stevens-Henager students, and then used those leads to increase Eagle Gate's student
population and decrease Stevens-Henager's student population.
Under Utah law, once a plaintiff provides sufficient evidence of proximate cause,
a jury is "entitled to determine the extent of Plaintiff s damages" and the plaintiff does
not need to "precisely identify" the extent of its damages. Sohm v. Dixie Eve Ctr., 2007
UT App 235,1flj 17-18, 166 P.3d 614. Rather, "[w]hen evidence supports a finding of the
fact of damage, i.e., proximate cause, a defendant should not escape liability because the
amount of damage cannot be proved with precision." Id, If 2^).
Under Rule 56(c), deposition testimony may be used to demonstrate a "genuine
issue as to any material fact." Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). Stevens-Henager provided
deposition testimony that Eagle Gate's unlawful conduct was the proximate cause of a
number of different types of damages, including (i) the lost productivity of the
experienced employees stolen by Eagle Gate; (ii) the costs of hiring and training less
experienced and less productive employees; (iii) the costs associated with ineffective
advertising and marketing when Eagle Gate misappropriated the fruits of that advertising
and marketing; (iv) the effects of reduced morale on various campuses; and (v) the lost
tuition payments from students who otherwise would have attended Stevens-Henager.

11146317
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Stevens-Henager even quantified the reduction in student recruits after one of its
experienced employees joined Eagle Gate as 3 students per month, a number that can
easily be translated into lost tuition dollars. The deposition testimony is more than
sufficient to create a question of fact concerning damages for the jury. The district court
erred in granting the motion for summary judgment.
The district court then based a number of subsequent rulings upon its erroneous
summary judgment ruling, including (i) dismissing Stevens-Henager's claim for
injunctive relief and attorney fees under the Federal Computer Fraud and Abuse Act on
the ground that a plaintiff must first prove damages totaling at least $5,000; (ii) granting a
motion in limine to preclude Stevens-Henager from presenting evidence of damages at
trial; and (iii) striking Stevens-Henager's expert report concerning damages.
This court not only should reverse the district court's grant of summary judgment,
but also should vacate subsequent rulings based upon the summary judgment ruling.
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
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Argument
The issue before this court is whether the district court erred in granting Eagle
Gate's Rule 56 motion for summary judgment on the groundthat Stevens-Henager had
not provided evidence of "any damages" sufficient to create a disputed issue of material
fact for the jury. Put differently, the issue is whether Stevens-Henager, in opposing Eagle
Gate's motion for summary judgment, provided evidence sufficient to create a question
of fact as to whether it suffered "any damages" as a result of [Eagle Gate's unlawful
conduct. As demonstrated below, Stevens-Henager provided ample evidence to preclude
judgment as a matter of law. This court should reverse.
Before addressing this issue, however, it is important to be clear about what issues
are not before this court. The briefing and rulings in the district court discuss a number
of tangential issues, which may have clouded the issues before the district court. What is
not before the court is (i) a Rule 11 motion for sanctions concerning the amount of
damages listed in the complaint; (ii) a Rule 37 motion for discovery sanctions for failing
to cooperate in the discovery process; (iii) a sanction for failure to update initial
disclosures under Rule 26(a); or (iv) whether Stevens-Henagpr could have provided more
evidence of damages in opposing summary judgment. Nor does this appeal involve a
motion for summary judgment directed at a particular category of damages. Instead, this
appeal involves a motion for summary judgment contending that Stevens-Henager could
not prove "any damages." (R. 3155.) It is this issue that SteVens-Henager addresses in
this brief.

11146317
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I.

Stevens-Henager Provided Sufficient Evidence of Its Damages to Preclude
Summary Judgment
Stevens-Henager provided sufficient evidence of its damages in opposing Eagle

Gate's motion for summary judgment. Under Utah law, summary judgment is
appropriate only when, viewing "the facts and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom
in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party," there exists "no genuine issue as to
any material fact and . . . the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law."
Sohm v. Dixie Eve Ctr.. 2007 UT App 235, % 13, 166 P.3d 614. Importantly, review of
summary judgment rulings should be "guided by the general judicial policy that favors a
trial on the merits when there is some doubt as to the propriety of a summary judgment."
King v. Searle Pharms., Inc.. 832 P.2d 858, 864-65 (Utah 1992).
Here, Eagle Gate moved for summary judgment on the sole ground that StevensHenager could not prove that it suffered "any damages" as a result of Eagle Gate's
unlawful conduct, which consisted of Eagle Gate's predatory hiring of Stevens-Henager's
employees, those employees stealing Stevens-Henager's computer files containing leads
for potential students, and Eagle Gate then using that confidential information to increase
Eagle Gate's revenues and decrease Stevens-Henager's revenues. Apart from the
obvious damage resulting from such conduct, Stevens-Henager provided more than
enough evidence of its damages to preclude summary judgment.
Below, Stevens-Henager will first outline the legal standard concerning what
evidence of damages is required to preclude summary judgment and then set forth the
evidence Stevens-Henager provided to demonstrate that Stevens-Henager satisfied that
standard.

11146317
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A.

Under Utah Law, Evidence That Unlawful Conduct Was the Proximate
Cause of Damage Is Sufficient to Preclude Summary Judgment

Stevens-Henager did not need to precisely identify the extent of its damages in
opposing summary judgment. Under Utah law, once a plaintiff provides evidence of an
injury, the plaintiff does not need to "precisely identify the extent of Plaintiff s damages."
Sohm v. Dixie Eve Ctr., 2007 UT App 235,1j 17, 166 P.3d 614. Because damages
present a question of fact that is "distinctly within the jury's province," once a plaintiff
provides sufficient evidence of proximate cause, a jury is "erititled to determine the extent
of Plaintiff s damages." Id^f 18 (quoting Judd v. Drezga, 2004 UT 91, 103 P.3d 135).
In Sohm, like here, the defendant moved for summary judgment on "the extent of
Plaintiffs recoverable damages and Plaintiffs evidence regarding the same." Id. ^f 14.
The district court granted summary judgment on the ground that the plaintiff had not
provided sufficient evidence of damages. The plaintiff had provided only testimony that
plaintiffs lost vision resulted from medical malpractice, but no evidence of "how much
better" plaintiffs vision would have been in the absence of the malpractice or the
monetary value of that loss. Id. ^f 20. This court reversed, holding that evidence the
defendant caused plaintiff to lose some vision was sufficient to allow a jury to award
non-speculative damages, even though the plaintiff provided no quantification of
damages in opposing summary judgment. Id. ^f 19. As this court explained, "[w]hen
evidence supports a finding of the fact of damage, i.e., proximate cause, a defendant
should not escape liability because the amount of damage cannot be proved with
precision." Id. f 20.
Confirming that a quantification of damages is not necessary to preclude summary
judgment, this court has held that evidence of the fact of damages at trial is sufficient to
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preclude a directed verdict. Renegade Oil Inc. v. Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., 2004 UT
App 356, If 13, 101 P.3d 383. In Renegade Oil the plaintiff presented evidence that but
for the insurance company's negligence the plaintiff would not have had to defend a
personal injury lawsuit himself. Id.fflf11, 13. While the plaintiff presented evidence at
trial of the existence of that personal injury lawsuit, it presented no calculation of its
damages, i.e., the costs associated with the lawsuit. Id. ^f 4. The defendant moved for
directed verdict on the ground that plaintiff had not provided sufficient evidence of his
damages, but the trial court denied the motion and this court affirmed. This court
reasoned that, even though the plaintiff had provided no evidence of the costs associated
with the personal injury lawsuit, by proving that plaintiff had, in fact, suffered damages,
"the amount of damages would equal the costs related to the [personal injury] lawsuit that
otherwise would have been covered by the policy." Id ^f 13. Thus, Renegade Oil
confirms that evidence of the fact of damages is sufficient to preclude judgment as a
matter of law even in the absence of a calculation of the amount of damages.
A recent Utah Supreme Court case provides further confirmation. Anderson Dev.
Co. v. Tobias, 2005 UT 36,133, 116 P.3d 323. In Tobias, the court reversed the entry of
summary judgment where the plaintiff provided evidence of the fact of damages, but not
the amount of damages. Id. In Tobias, plaintiff provided evidence that it had paid more
for real estate due to defendants' misrepresentation, but provided no evidence of how
much more it had paid. Id The Utah Supreme Court nonetheless reversed the entry of
summary judgment because even this "thin" evidence was sufficient to present a nonspeculative question of fact concerning damages for trial. Id. Again, proof that
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defendants' conduct was the proximate cause of damages is sufficient to preclude
summary judgment, even in the absence of a quantification of those damages.
B.

Stevens-Henager Provided Evidence That Eagle Gate's Unlawful
Conduct Was the Proximate Cause of Damages to Stevens-Henager

Stevens-Henager provided ample evidence of its damages and demonstrated that
Eagle Gate's unlawful conduct was the proximate cause of those damages. Therefore,
summary judgment was inappropriate.
Carol Gastiger, a Campus President of Stevens-Henager, testified that when Eagle
Gate engaged in predatory hiring of Stevens-Henager employees, had those employees
steal computer files from Stevens-Henager, and then used those stolen files to undermine
Stevens-Henager's efforts to recruit new students, Stevens-Henager suffered the
following damages: (i) a "loss of the Tongan population" and the money StevensHenager spent recruiting that population; and (ii) reduced productivity from the loss of
Stevens-Henager's "Admissions Consultant," where the stolen consultant had averaged
8 student recruits per month but her replacement averaged oflly 5 per month, which
resulted in lost tuition dollars. (R. 3332-33.)
Ms. Gastiger even performed a calculation to demonstrate the extent of damages
to Stevens-Henager. Ms. Gastiger testified that when you take the number of fewer
students recruited by the replacement employee—3 per mon^h—and "multiply that times
tuition," then that is "real money, in my opinion, that's been lost." (R. 3332-33.) In
addition, there is a straightforward way to determine the damages associated with the
money Stevens-Henager spent recruiting the Tongan population before Eagle Gate
illegally enticed the director of those recruiting efforts to joih Eagle Gate and recruit the
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same potential students. The costs of those undermined recruiting efforts are hard costs.
Like Renegade Oil the record here reveals a straightforward way to arrive at a dollar
amount of damages—lost tuition from 3 fewer student recruits per month and the hard
costs associated with marketing and recruiting efforts.
Vicki Dewsnup, another Campus President of Stevens-Henager and its Regional
Director, testified about "tremendous damage" including (i) the costs of "advertising and
marketing" that were ineffective when Eagle Gate misappropriated the student leads the
advertising and marketing had generated; (ii) the inability of Stevens-Henager to contact
its student leads because Eagle Gate's unlawful conduct had left Stevens-Henager
without "adequate phone numbers;" (iii) the "damage to morale at the campuses;" and
(iv) the "loss of employees." (R. 3333-34.)
Carl Barney, owner of Stevens-Henager, testified that Stevens-Henager had
suffered damages of "many millions of dollars" from (i) the "loss of the [student] starts"
for "at least two of the campuses, Provo and Ogden," which led to a reduction in "an
income stream over three or four years;" (ii) having "to rebuild the admissions
department;" and (iii) the "decline in morale." (R. 3334-35.)
Stevens-Henager therefore provided evidence that Eagle Gate's unlawful conduct
was the proximate cause of a number of different types of damages, including (i) the lost
productivity of the experienced employees who joined Eagle Gate; (ii) the costs of hiring
and training less experienced and less productive employees; (iii) the costs associated
with advertising and marketing when Eagle Gate misappropriated the fruits of that
3

Stevens-Henager attributed a dollar amount of $200,000 to these damages as early as
the complaint. (R. 7-8.)
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advertising and marketing; (iv) the effects of reduced morale on various campuses; and
(v) the lost tuition payments from students who otherwise would have attended StevensHenager.4 This evidence is more than sufficient to create a question of fact concerning
damages for the jury to consider and, more important, to prevent Eagle Gate from
escaping entirely from compensating Stevens-Henager for the consequences of Eagle
Gate's illegal conduct.
Because Eagle Gate's motion for summary judgment was fashioned to address
only whether Stevens-Henager had suffered "any damages," when Stevens-Henager
provided some evidence of damages, the motion should have been denied in its entirety.
This court should reverse the order granting summary judgment to permit StevensHenager to present evidence of its damages to a jury.
II.

This Court Should Vacate Subsequent Rulings Based Upon the District
Court's Summary Judgment Ruling
If this court reverses the district court's grant of summary judgment, it also should

reverse subsequent orders based upon the grant of summary judgment. McKee v.
Williams, 741 P.2d 978, 982 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) ("Since the partial summary judgment
set into play the entire chain of subsequent proceedings, we also reverse all subsequent
orders and judgments and remand the case for trial."); see al^o Loporto v. Hoegemann,

The categories of damages are confirmed by Stevens-Henager's initial disclosures:
"Such damage includes (1) damage to Stevens-Henager's goodwill resulting from
Defendants' acts, (2) damage to or destruction of Stevens-Henager's lead lists,
(3) damage resulting from Defendants' misappropriation of Stevens-Henager's lead lists,
(4) lost investment and productivity due to Defendants' predatory hiring of key StevensHenager personnel, (5) lost revenues due to an untold number of prospective students
electing not to attend Stevens-Henager as a result of defendants' unlawful and unfair
competition, etc." (R. 3700.)
11146317
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1999 UT App 175,115, 982 P.2d 586 ("we reverse the trial court's entry of default and
subsequent orders based on that default").
In this case, there are at least three subsequent orders based upon the district
court's summary judgment ruling. First, on May 30, 2008, the district court granted
Eagle Gate's motion to strike the report of Stevens-Henager's damages expert "[b]ased
on the Court's prior rulings," including the rulings on Eagle Gate's motion for summary
judgment and Stevens-Henager's motion to reconsider the order granting summary
judgment. (R. 3994.) Second, on August 31, 2009, the district court granted Eagle
Gate's motion in limine to exclude any evidence of monetary damages—a motion
necessary only because there is evidence of monetary damages—on the ground that the
remaining prayer for injunctive relief does not require proof of damages, and therefore,
evidence of monetary damages is irrelevant. (R. 4368.) Third, on August 31, 2009, the
district court dismissed Stevens-Henager's claim for injunctive relief and attorney fees
under the Federal Computer Fraud and Abuse Act on the ground that Stevens-Henager
could not prove damages totaling at least $5,000, a requirement under the Act. (R. 4366.)
Because these orders are based, at least in part, on the district court's grant of
summary judgment, if this court reverses the order granting summary judgment, this
court should also vacate these subsequent orders to permit the district court to consider
them in the absence of its summary judgment ruling.
Conclusion
This court should reverse the order granting summary judgment because, in
opposing the motion for summary judgment, Stevens-Henager provided sufficient
evidence of its damages through deposition testimony to create an issue of material fact
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for trial. Because the district court erred in its summary judgment ruling, this court also
should vacate all subsequent orders based upon that ruling.
DATED this 18th day of February, 2010.
SNELL & WILMER L.L.P.

Troy L. Bbotie
Attorneyjor Appellant Stevens-Henager
College
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

STEVENS-HENAGER COLLEGE,

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 040921860

vs.
EAGLE GATE COLLEGE, PROVO COLLEGE,
MOSESE IONGI, TREVOR SMITH,
WALLACE ROGERS, RICHARD HORWITZ,
STEVEN TODD KNECHT and JANA MILLER,
Defendants.

This matter came before the Court on January 22, 2007, in connection
with Defendants Eagle Gate College, Provo College and Jana Miller's
Motion for Summary Judgment,

The Court will refer to these parties

herein as the "Eagle Gate Parties."

At the conclusion of the hearing,

the Court took the matter under advisement to further consider the
parties' respective

legal positions, their written submissions and

counsel's oral argument.

The Court should note that during the hearing,

a representative of Eagle Gate College was permitted to speak briefly on
the issue of what was contained in documents that were produced by the
Eagle Gate Parties in November of 2007. While these statements provided
helpful clarification, the Court did not rely on them in forming its
decision on the pending Motion for Summary Judgment.
that Motion as stated herein.

The Court rules on

STEVENS-HENAGER COLLEGE
V. EAGLE GATE COLLEGE

PAGE 2

MEMORANDUM DECISION

LEGAL ANALYSIS
The Eagle Gate Parties' Motion for Summary Judgment asserts that the
Plaintiff

has

failed

to provide

supporting its damages claim.

the basis

for and a

calculation

The Plaintiff counters that an expert

opinion concerning damages has been delayed because the Eagle Gate
Parties have only recently provided information necessary to compute
damages.
Notably, the parties agree that expert testimony is needed in order
to establish damages in this case.

Further, in reviewing the procedural

history of this matter, which spans over four years, it is apparent that
the Plaintiff has had ample opportunity to designate an expert on
damages, to formulate the basis of its damages claim and to provide an
expert report concerning the same.
During the hearing, it became clear that the information which would
substantiate such damages is, at least in part, in the Plaintiff's own
possession.

Further, the Court is satisfied that through discovery the

Plaintiff has been able to glean the remaining information necessary for
its experts to assess damages and to issue a report concerning the same.
In reaching this conclusion, the Court carefully considered, but was
unpersuaded by the Plaintiff s theory that the information provided by
the Eagle Gate Parties was "substantially incomplete" until the November
supplementation.

In this regard, the Plaintiff relies heavily on the

fact that the Court previously ordered supplementation of a "lead list"

STEVENS -HENAGER COLLEGE
V. EAGLE GATE COLLEGE
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and spreadsheet provided by the Eagle Gate Parties, to the extent that
this information was incomplete. To be clear, the Court determines that
even in the absence of such supplementation, tl^e Plaintiff had already
been provided
damages.

sufficient

information

for it$ experts to calculate

Despite this, the Plaintiff has failed to produce any

calculations or expert reports concerning damages and all relevant
deadlines have now passed.
Counsel for the Plaintiff alluded to having previously sought to
extend the deadlines in this case and indicate^ that the Court had not
yet ruled on that Motion. The Plaintiff did fil^ a Motion to Extend the
Dates Set Forth in the Order Granting Plaintifif's to Extend Discovery
Period on June 26, 2007.

It appears that this Motion may have been

overlooked because of the flurry of other Motions which were pending at
that time.

However, as the Court pointed out during the hearing, the

Plaintiff has effectively had nearly six months (rather than the 60 days
sought) to have its experts complete their expert reports on damages.
Despite the passage of this extensive time period, the Plaintiff is
apparently no closer to submitting an expert report than it was when the
request for extension was filed.
It should also be noted that the Plaintiff has requested extensions
in the past, which the Court has previously grafted.

However, at this

juncture, there is simply no excuse or justification for the Plaintiff's
delays in providing expert reports and computations of its damages.

STEVENS -HRNAGER COLLEGE
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Indeed, while the Plaintiff had sufficient information to formulate the
basis for Its damages claim and to provide expert reports, even if on a
preliminary basis, it apparently made a tactical decision not to do so.
The Plaintiff, and not the Eagle Gate Parties, bears responsibility for
having failed in this regard.
The Court is similarly unpersuaded by counsel's suggestion that
until causation could be assessed, it was impossible for the Plaintiff
to calculate damages.

The factual issues surrounding causation in this

case are not the subject of expert testimony and would not preclude the
Plaintiff from making the separate assessment of damages (again, even if
on a preliminary basis).
Overall, the Court determines that despite this late stage in the
litigation, the Plaintiff has failed entirely to substantiate its damages
claim. Further, the Court is simply not persuaded that the Plaintiff has
been unable to do so because of a lack of information.

The Court

reiterates that the Plaintiff has had sufficient information to compute
damages, but has failed to produce any calculations or expert reports to
substantiate its damages claim and the time for doing so has now expired.
In the absence of evidence to substantiate the damages element of the
Plaintiff's claims, the Court grants summary judgment in favor of the
Eagle Gate Parties.
Counsel

for

the

Eagle

Gate

Parties

is

to

prepare

an

Order

consistent, but not limited to, this Memorandum Decision, indicating that
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their Motion for Summary Judgment is granted.

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Counsel should include a

procedural history detailing the information provided, extensions granted
and the Plaintiff's failure to produce expert reports or calculations of
damages (despite repeated requests by the Eagle Gate Parties).
Dated this

of January, 2008.

ROBERT P. FAU
DISTRICT COURT
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Attorneys for Eagle Gate College, Provo College and Jana Miller
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
j ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY
JUDGMENT AGAINST PLAINTIFF ON
Plaintiff,
ITS CLAIMS AGAINST EAGLE GATE
COLLEGE, PROVO COLLEGE AND
vs.
JANA MILLER (Breach Of Contract;
Violation Of The Uniform Trade Secret
EAGLE GATE COLLEGE, PROVO
Act; Interference With Contractual
COLLEGE, MOSESEIONGI, TREVOR
Relations; Violation Of The Federal
SMITH, WALLACE ROGERS,
Computer Fraud And Abuse Act;
RICHARD HORWITZ, STEVEN TODD
Statutory Unfair Competition; And Civil
KNECHT and JANA MILLER,
Conspiracy)

STEVENS-HENAGER COLLEGE,

Defendants.

Case No. 040921860
Judge Robert Faust

Eagle Gate College, Provo College, and Jana Millers (the "Eagle Gate Parties") Motion
for Summary Judgment (re: Claims Against Eagle Gate College, Provo College and Jana Miller)
came on for hearing before the Court on January 22, 2008. The Eagle Gate Parties were

represented by Thomas R. Karrenberg, Nathan B. Wilcox and Jennifer R. Eshelman of Anderson
& Karrenberg. Plaintiff was represented by Robert E. Mansfield, Scott M. Lilja and Lisa B.
Bohman of VanCott Bagley Cornwall & McCarthy. The Court, having carefully reviewed and
considered the pleadings and papers submitted by the parties with respect to the Motion, and
having rendered its Memorandum Decision on January 30, 2008, hereby enters the following
order:
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED:
For the reasons set forth in the Memorandum Decision dated January 30, 2008, and set
forth in further detail below, the Eagle Gate Parties> Motion for Summary Judgment is granted.
Plaintiffs claims for Breach of Contract, Violation of the Uniform Trade Secrets Act,
Interference with Contractual Relations, Interference with Prospective Economic Relations,
Violation of the Federal Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, Statutory Unfair Competition, and
Civil Conspiracy are hereby dismissed with prejudice.
Procedural History
On October 16, 2004, Plaintiff filed its Complaint against the Eagle Gate Parties, among
others, asserting claims for Breach of Contract,1 Violation of the Uniform Trade Secrets Act,
Interference with Contractual Relations, Interference with Prospective Economic Relations,
Violation of the Federal Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, Statutory Unfair Competition, and

The Breach of Contract Claim was only asserted against Ms. Miller.

Civil Conspiracy. (Statement of Facts ("SOF") fl 1 and 2?) For its causes of action, Plaintiff
claimed over three years ago that it had incurred, and was therefore entided to, damages in amounts
"not less than" $10,250,000.00. (See Compl. pp. 27 - 30.)3 Despite the averments in its Complaint
of damages of not less than $10,250,000.00, on November 15, 2004, Plaintiff represented in its
Initial Disclosures that it had "not yet computed the damages it has suffered as alleged in the
Complaint" (SOFK5.)
On November 18,2004, counsel for the Eagle Gate Parties sent a letter to Plaintiffs counsel
requesting that in light of the allegations in Plaintiffs Complaint of damages in specified minimum
amounts and its admission that it had not computed any damages, Plaintiff either supplement its
Initial Disclosures or amend its Complaint

(SOF ^ 6.)

2

Counsel for Plaintiff responded that

The Eagle Gate Parties' Motion for Summary Judgment cited to a "Statement of Facts." Plaintiff
responded to facts nos. 1, 2, 3, 10, 15, 20, 21, 23, 24, 26, 27, 28, 29, and 31, as "Undisputed" or
"Undisputed and immaterial,5' and facts nos. 4, 5, 6, 14, 22, as "Undisputed but incomplete" and cited
additional information. These facts are uncontroverted pursuant to Rule 7(cX3XA) of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure and deemed admitted.
3
Specifically, Plaintiff alleges in its Complaint that it was entitled to damages against the Eagle Gate
Parties in the following amounts for the following claims:
"not less than the sum of $250,000" — breach of contract against Ms. Miller individually (see Compl.
p. 27);
"not less than the sum of $1,000,000" — violation of the Uniform Trade Secrets Act (see Compl. p.
28);
"not less than the sum of $1,000,000" - interference with contractual relations (see id);
"not less than the sum of $1,000,000" — interference with prospective economic relations (see
Compl. p. 29);
"not less than the sum of $1,000,000" — violation of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (see id. );
"not less than the sum of $1,000,000"- statutory unfair competition (see Compl. p. 30; and
"not less than the sum of $5,000,000" - civil conspiracy (see id.).
(SOF p . )

3

"Plaintiff was not able to give a detailed computation of its damages at that point in the litigation."
(Plaintiffs Responses to SOF ] 6.)
Thereafter, the Eagle Gate Parties' counsel contacted Plaintiffs counsel to request that
Plaintiff identify the factual basis for its claim in its Complaint that it had damages in excess of
$10,000,000.00, including the computation thereof. (SOF % 7.4) In response, Plaintiffs counsel
represented that the computations were simply an estimate made by some of the members of
Plaintiffs management as to the amount of Plaintiffs damages, but that there were not any specific
documents or computations on which Plaintiff based its damages allegations in its Complaint (SOF
17.)
On December 15, 2004, the Eagle Gate Parties sent a letter to Plaintiffs counsel asking
for clarification of Plaintiffs counsel's representation that tlthe calculation of [damages], as set
forth in [the] Complaint, was simply a guess by some members of management as to the
damages that [Plaintiff] may have incurred" and requesting that Plaintiff comply with its
obligations under Rule 26 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. (SOF ^ 8.5)
On December 2, 2004, the Eagle Gate Parties served Plaintiff with Defendants Eagle Gate
College, Provo College, Richard Horwitz and Jana Miller's First Request for Production of
Documents. (SOF ^ 9.) In their Requests for Production of Documents, the Eagle Gate Parties
requested that Plaintiff produce "any and all documents that evidence, refer or relate to, or are
4

In response to SOP ^| 7, Plaintiff made a statement about what it did not dispute, but failed to controvert
any of the facts set forth therein. Thus, the facts set forth in SOP ^ 7 are deemed admitted.
5

In response to Statement of Fact No. 8, Plaintiff does not dispute that the letter was sent or the content of
the letter.
4

sufficient to ascertain any damages Stevens-Henager claims to have suffered as a result of any of
the Defendant's purported misappropriation of the iead list' or other trade secrets." The Eagle Gate
Parties further requested the production of "all documents that evidence, refer or relate to, or are
sufficient to ascertain any damages Plaintiff allegedly suffered as a result of [the alleged actions of
the Defendants] including, but not limited to, any computation of such alleged damages." (SOF

110.)
On January 10, 2005, Plaintiff responded to each of the Eagle Gate Parties' Requests for
Production of Documents relating to damages with a verbatim restatement of the explanation set
forth in its Initial Disclosures: "[Plaintiff] has not yet computed the damages it has suffered

To

the extent any of these categories of damages can be quantified, [Plaintiff] will supplement these
responses when sufficient information is available by which to make such calculations." (SOF T[l l 6
and Response thereto.)
On July 1,2005, the Eagle Gate Parties filed a Motion to Compel seeking an orderfromthe
Honorable Judge Steven Roth compelling Plaintiff to, inter alia, (a) amend its Initial Disclosures
to provide a damage computation and (b) appropriately respond to the Eagle Gate Parties*
discovery requests regarding damages. (See Mot to Compel and for Sanctions, July 1, 2005.)
After hearing oral argument on the matter, Judge Roth ordered Plaintiff to respond to the Eagle
Gate Parties5 document requests regarding damages. (See Order Re: Mot. to Compel and for
Sanctions, December 30, 2005.) In response to Judge Roth's Order compelling Plaintiff to

6

Plaintiff purported to dispute SOF ^| 11, but the cited evidence does not controvert it. Thus, it is
admitted.
5

produce documents that support its damage claims, in early January 2006, Plaintiff produced
documents purporting to summarize the "starts" at its various campuses from 2003 to 2005 by
month and quarter and Quick Books print outs titled General Ledger and Trial Balance for
Plaintiff at its various campuses. (SOF f 16.7) None of the documents produced contained any
calculations of damages or explanation as to how the documents supported or evidenced
Plaintiffs claim of damages in excess of $10,000,000.00. (SOF K 19.8)
On January 12, 2006, counsel for the Eagle Gate Parties again requested in writing that
Plaintiff provide the underlying documents supporting the summaries and other documents that
Plaintiff claimed supported its damages. (SOF \ 17.9) Plaintiff, however, did not respond to the
request by counsel. (SOF ^[ 17.)
On June 9, 2006, counsel for the Eagle Gate Parties sent another letter to counsel for
Plaintiff asking Plaintiff to confirm that there were no other documents relating to Plaintiffs
claim of over $10,000,000.00 in damages beyond the summaries of starts and the General
Ledgers and Trial Balances. (SOF % 18.) Plaintiffs counsel did not respond. (SOF ^ 18.10)
On or about January 17, 2007, Jana Miller served her First Set of Interrogatories on
Plaintiff. (SOF K 20). Many of Ms. Miller's Interrogatories asked Plaintiff to identify "[a]ll
7

Although Plaintiff purports to dispute this fact, the affidavit testimony it cites to controvert it does not
controvert it and it is deemed admitted under Rule 7(c)(3)(A) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
8
Although Plaintiff purports to dispute this fact, the deposition testimony it cites to controvert it does not
controvert it and it is deemed admitted under Rule 7(cX3XA) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
9
Although Plainttiff purports to dispute this fact and labels it as immaterial, claiming that it need not
respond to informal requests for documents, the affidavit testimony it cites to controvert it does not
controvert it and it is deemed admitted under Rule 7(c)(3)(A) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
10
Although Plaintiff purports to dispute this fact and labels it as immaterial, claiming that it need not
respond to informal requests for documents, the affidavit testimony it cites to controvert it does not
controvert it and it is deemed admitted under Rule 7(cX3XA) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
6

damages that [Plaintiff] claimjs] to have [or purportedly] suffered as a result of [the alleged acts
of Ms. Miller], including a detailed statement of the method of the calculation of any such
damages and any facts [Plaintiff) relied upon in computing any alleged damages." (SOF K 21.)
Plaintiff repeatedly responded to the above referenced requests for information concerning the
identification and calculation of damages by simply stating that "Plaintiffs experts will provide
information and analysis concerning the damages suffered."(SOF ^ 22.)
Similarly, on or about January 17, 2007, Eagle Gate and Provo College served their First
Set of Interrogatories on Plaintiff. (SOF f 23.) Eagle Gate and Provo College's Interrogatories
asked Plaintiff to identify "[a]U damages that [Plaintiff] purportedly suffered as a result of [the
various alleged acts of Eagle Gate or Provo College], including a detailed statement of the
method of the calculation of any alleged damages and any facts [Plaintiff] relied upon in
computing any alleged damages." (SOF ^ 24.) Plaintiff repeatedly responded to the requests for
information concerning damages by stating that "Plaintiffs experts will provide information and
analysis concerning the damages suffered." (SOF H 25 u .)
In November, 2006, the parties filed a Second Joint Motion to Amend Scheduling Order
and the Second Amended Scheduling Order was entered by Judge Skanchy on November 16,
2006. The November 16,2006 Order established a fact discovery deadline of February 28, 2007,
and a deadline for expert witness reports of March 9, 2007. On March 7, 2007, Plaintiff filed a

11

Although Plaintiff purports to dispute this fact, the affidavit testimony it cites to controvert it does not
controvert it and it is deemed admitted under Rule 7(c)(3)(A) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

7

motion to extend the discovery cutoff in the case. The basis for its request for an extension of the
discovery cutoff was specifically stated in its Reply Memorandum as follows:
In" seeking an extension to conduct fact discovery, Plaintiff seeks
additional time for only two purposes. First, it seeks an extension
to permit its experts to review the hard drive of Jana Miller...and
to follow up on any additional discovery arising from that review.
Second, it seeks an extension to conduct the out-of-state deposition
of Todd Knecht, a party to this action whose whereabouts had
previously been unknown.
On April 18, 2007, the Court granted Plaintiffs Motion and extended the pertinent deadlines by
sixty days, establishing the new deadline for the completion of all fact discovery as June 18,
2007, and the deadline for Plaintiff to provide any expert witness reports as June 28, 2007.
Beyond conducting the deposition of Mr. Knecht on June 12, 2007, Plaintiff conducted no
further discovery during the extended discovery period.
On June 6, 2007, Plaintiff filed a Motion to Compel Defendant's Discovery Responses
seeking an order compelling contact information for former employees of Plaintiff who had
subsequently worked for either Eagle Gate College or Provo College12 and to tcproduce a copy of
Eagle Gate College's database in its original format." The Motion was based, in relevant part, on
its requests seeking "Copies of each lead list prepared, accessed, modified, or otherwise used in
carrying out his or her responsibilities to Eagle Gate College by Jana Miller, Todd Knecht and
Wallace Rogers" and "Documents sufficient to ascertain each and every change or alteration to
any lead list owned, possessed, or otherwise controlled by Eagle Gate College that were made
by Jana Miller, Todd Knecht, and Wallace Rogers."
12

This information was subsequently provided.
8

Eagle Gate and Provo College opposed the Motion, asserting that neither of the document
requests that Plaintiff referenced requested the production of the entirety of Eagle Gate's
database. On July 26, 2007, the Court, accordingly entered a Minute Entry ruling that because
Plaintiff had not requested the database in discovery, the Court could not compel its production.
The Court also noted, based on the pleadings submitted, that Eagle Gate College and Provo
College had appropriately responded to the requests by compiling a list of 37,000 names of
potential students and their contact information and provided a spreadsheet identifying changes
made to the database by Jana Miller.
On June 20, 2007, in response to interrogatories from Plaintiff, Provo College and Eagle
Gate College produced hard copies of spreadsheets identifying all of the "self-generated" leads
for the individual defendants in this matter.
On June 25, 2007, Plaintiff filed another Motion to Extend the discovery period seeking
to extend all of the discovery deadlines and other dates by sixty days from the entry of an order
granting the Motion to Extend. Plaintiff alleged that it required the requested extension so that it
could review Eagle Gate College's electronic database in "native format" (a request the Court
had already declined to compel because it had not been requested in discovery), and to depose
individuals who formerly worked for Plaintiff who had since worked for Eagle Gate or Provo
College—a heretofore unmentioned reason for extending discovery. Thereafter, the Plaintiff did
not do anyfiirtherdiscovery of the Eagle Gate Parties.
On October 9, 2007, the Eagle Gate Parties filed their Motion for Summary Judgment on
all of Plaintiffs claims against them. In the summary judgment motions, the Eagle Gate Parties

9

alleged that (a) Plaintiff had failed to provide a basis for, and a calculation of, its damages claim,
(b) Plaintiff had failed to provide any expert reports substantiating its damages (which it had
claimed was necessary), and (c) the time for providing expert reports or expert discovery and fact
discovery had passed. Plaintiff opposed the motion for summary judgment alleging that it
needed an expert witness to provide a calculation of its damages set forth in its Complaint filed
in October 2004, and that it had been unable to provide an expert report during the preceding
three years because the Eagle Gate Parties had only recently provided the information necessary
for it to do so.
It is uncontrovertable, however, that based upon what Plaintiff alleges are the categories
of its damages, it is Plaintiff- not the Eagle-Gate Parties - that possesses material information
relating to the calculation of PlaintifFs damages. It is also undisputed that the information that
Plaintiff alleges that it needs from the Eagle Gate Parties to compute its damages has been, at
least in part, in PlaintifFs possession since before Plaintiff commenced this litigation.
Specifically, in opposition to the Eagle Gate Parties5 Motion, Plaintiff submitted the deposition
testimony of PlaintifFs President, Carl Barney, in which Mr. Barney testified that PlaintifFs
damages consisted of "[t]he loss of starts," "[t]he cost of hiring and training new people" and
"[t]he efforts to rebuild the admissions department."
PlaintifFs briefing characterized its damage claim as including "an analysis of the impact
of Defendants' breach of employment contracts on Stevens-Henager enrollment rates and the
value of Plaintiff; and an analysis of the increased costs and decreased productivity caused by
Defendants' poaching of PlaintifFs employees."

10

Plaintiff, not the Eagle Gate Parties, possesses the information necessary to calculate its
alleged damages the loss of employees had on its enrollment rates, the cost of hiring and training
new people, and the cost of rebuilding its admissions department

Yet, it has supplied no

calculation or evidence regarding these damages whatsoever supporting its damages claims.
Plaintiff indicated at the hearing that these damages were not the main damages sought by
Plaintiff. The Court finds this troubling in light of the fact that Plaintiffs Complaint seeks
damages in an amount "not less than the sum of $1,000,000'* against the Eagle Gate Parties for
interfering with its contractual relations with its employees.13
Even if these damages are not the main damages sought by Plaintiff, the fact remains that
it had a duty to compute them and provide them to the Eagle Gate Parties pursuant to Rule 26
and the Court's multiple scheduling orders and did not. Moreover, the Eagle Gate Parties
provided Plaintiff with sufficient information for its expert(s) to calculate, even if preliminarily,14
the other damages Plaintiff claims.15
13

To allege damages in its Complaint in good faith as "not less than" sums, Plaintiff must have engaged
in some form of computation. Indeed, Rule 11 mandates that Plaintiffs allegations must be based upon
some reasonable inquiry or belief and have an evidentiary basis. See Utah R. Civ. P. 11(b)(3); see also
Rhineheart v. Stcmffer, 638 F. 2d 1169, 1171 (9* Cir. 1980) (before filing complaint, attorney has duty to
"ascertain that the damages sought appear to bear a reasonable relation to injuries actually sustained");
Hudson v. Moore Business Forms, Inc., 836 F. 2d 1156, 1162 (9th Cir. 1987) (damages alleged in prayer
for relief "must meet the Rule 11 standard of reasonableness"). Plaintiffs repeated admission that it has
not computed its damages is a tacit admission that the allegations of damages in its Complaint in amounts
of "not less than" $250,000.00, $1,000,000.00, and $5,000,000.00 violate Rule 11. See Simpson v.
Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co.y 522 A. 2d 880, 884 (D.C. 1987) (response to discovery request that
answer will be supplied "as discovery continues" is "strong circumstantial evident" that plaintiff lacked
basis for claims at time of filing; if plaintiffs complaint was based on any pre-filing investigation,
plaintiff should have revealed that information in discovery).
14

Plaintiffs counsel indicated at the hearing of this matter that Plaintiff chose not to provide a
preliminary analysis due to a concern that it would somehow be used against them at the trial of this
11

Plaintiff has failed and refused to substantiate its damages in over three years of
litigation. Instead, Plaintiff has repeatedly stated the information would be provided through its
expert witness ieport(s). The deadlines for discovery and expert witness reports have now come
and gone four times with no expert report or computation of damages from Plaintiff Because
damages are an essential element of each of PlaintifFs claims against the Eagle Gate Parties, the
Eagle Gate Parties are entitled to dismissal of PlaintifFs claims against them as a matter of law.
There is no excuse or justification for PlaintifFs failure to provide expert reports and
computations of its damages.

Accordingly, the time for Plaintiff to have substantiated its

damages having passed, PlaintifFs claims against the Eagle Gate Parties are hereby dismissed
with prejudice.
DATED:

March |6N, 2008
BY THE COT

^ 4

^

Honorable Robert ]
THIRD DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

matter. PlaintifFs tactical decision not to provide timely expert reports is not the responsibility of the
Eagle Gate Parties and Plaintiff alone bears the responsibility forfoilingto do so.
15

PlaintifFs suggestion at the hearing that it needed additional information in order to demonstrate
causation is also unpersuasive. The causation aspect of PlaintifFs case is not within the domain of its
damages expert and would not preclude the Plaintifffrommaking an assessment of damages, even if only
a preliminary assessment.

12
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

STEVENS-HENAGER COLLEGE,
Plaintiff,
vs.

:

MINUTE ENTRY

:

CASE NO, 040921860

5

EAGLE GATE COLLEGE, PROVO COLLEGE, :
MOSESE IONGI, TREVOR SMITH,
WALLACE ROGERS, RICHARD HORWITZ,
:
STEVEN TODD KNECHT and JANA MILLER,
:
Defendants.

The Court has before it the Plaintiff's Motion for Relief From or
For Reconsideration of the Court's Order on Summary Judgment.

Having

reviewed the moving and responding memoranda, the Court rules as stated
herein.
After considering the parties' respective positions, the Court
determines that the Plaintiff's current Motion, with respect to the issue
of damages, is simply an attempt to re-argue or bolster the arguments
made in its original opposition.

However, even considering these re-

arguments, the Court remains convinced that the Plaintiff had adequate
information such that it could submit timely expert reports (even if on
a preliminary basis) to substantiate damages.

The Plaintiff's ability
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to provide such a report shortly after the Court rendered its summary
judgment decision (with no additional discovery) confirms this reality.
The Court further concludes that the Plaintiff has not met the standard
for excusable neglect.

It was simple inaction and lack of diligence on

the part of the Plaintiff that led to the Court's ultimate decision to
grant summary judgment.

The Court can find no legal or factual grounds

to reconsider this decision.
There is an issue, however, as to whether the Plaintiff's equitable
claims were subject to the Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment.

It

does not appear that the Plaintiff's equitable claims were part of the
Defendants' initial Motion, which was geared primarily to the lack of
evidence to substantiate the Plaintiff's damages claim. The Court agrees
that it was improper for this aspect of the Plaintiff's claims to be
dismissed in a summary fashion, when the issue of whether the Plaintiff
is indeed entitled to injunctive relief has never been fully briefed.
The Court concludes that those claims survive.

To the extent that the

Court's prior Order may be inconsistent with this, it should be modified
to accurately reflect that the equitable claims were not subject to the
Motion for Summary Judgment.
In closing, the Court notes that the Defendants have raised legal
arguments as to the viability of the Plaintiff's equitable claims. Such
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arguments are more properly brought in the form of a dispositive motion,
rather than an opposition to a Motion to Reconsider (particularly where
those arguments were not made in the underlying Motion for Summary
Judgment) . The Court will not consider the substantive merits of those
arguments in their current context.
This Minute Entry decision will stand as the Order of the Court,
granting the Plaintiff's Motion to Reconsider in part and denying it in
part.
Dated this

_day of May, 2008.

^*fc 0 F ty^

^u.

ROBERT P. FAUS'
DISTRICT COURT

w/\
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MAILING CERTIFICATE

I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the
foregoing Minute Entry, to the following, this / <A

Robert E. Mansfield
Scott M. Lilja
Lisa B» Bohman
Attorneys for Plaintiff
36 S. State Street, Suite 1900
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144
Thomas R. Karrenberg
Nathan B. Wilcox
Jennifer R. Eshelman
Attorneys for Defendants Eagle Gate
College, Provo College, Horwitz and Miller
50 W. Broadway, Suite 700
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-2006
Wallace Rogers
4376 South 2675 West
Roy, Utah 84067
Mark N, Brian
Attorney for Defendants Iongi and Smith
P.O. Box 173
Spanish Fork, Utah 84660

gay of May, 2008:
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

STEVENS -HENAGER COLLEGE,
Plaintiff,
vs,

$

MINUTE ENTRY

:

CASE NO. 040921860

:

EAGLE GATE COLLEGE, PROVO COLLEGE, :
MOSESE IONGI, TREVOR SMITH,
WALLACE ROGERS, RICHARD HORWITZ,
:
STEVEN TODD KNECHT and JANA MILLER,
Defendants.

The Court has before it a request for decision filed by Defendants
Eagle Gate College, Provo College and Jana Miller seeking a ruling on
their Motion to Strike Preliminary Expert Witness Report of Brad Townsend
and the Affidavit of Brad Townsend. Based on the Court's prior rulings,
including its recent ruling with respect to the Plaintiff's Motion for
Relief From or For Reconsideration of the Court's Order on Summary
Judgment, and on the grounds articulated in the Defendants' Motion to
Strike, the Court determines that this Motion is well-taken and therefore
granted.
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This Minute Entry decision will stand as the Order of the Court,
Dated this

.day of May, 2008.

$sfc
ROBERT P. FAU;
DISTRICT COURT'

m®
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MAILING CERTIFICATE

I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the
foregoing Minute Entry, to the following, this.

_day of May, 2008:

Robert E. Mansfield
Scott M. Lilja
Lisa B. Bohman
Attorneys for Plaintiff
36 S. State Street, Suite 1900
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144
Thomas R. Karrenberg
Nathan B. Wilcox
Jennifer R. Eshelman
Attorneys for Defendants Eagle Gate
College, Provo College, Horwitz and Miller
50 W. Broadway, Suite 700
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-2006
Wallace Rogers
4376 South 2675 West
Roy, Utah 84067
Mark N. Brian
Attorney for Defendants Iongi and Smith
P.O. Box 173
Spanish Fork, Utah 84660
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OP THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

STEVENS-HENAGER COLLEGE,
Plaintiff,
vs.

:

MEMORANDUM DECISION

s

CASE NO- 040921860

5

EAGLE GATE COLLEGE, PROVO COLLEGE, :
MOSESE IONGI, TREVOR SMITH,
WALLACE ROGERS, RICHARD HORWITZ,
s
STEVEN TODD KNECHT and JANA MILLER,
Defendants.

This matter came before the Court for a hearing on July 28, 2009,
in connection with the following Motions: Defendants Eagle Gate College,
Provo College and Jana Miller's (the "Defendants") Motion in Limine to
Exclude Evidence of Monetary Damages, Motion in Limine to Exclude Any
Login Tracking Lists that Purport to Show Jana Miller's Alleged Access
of Plaintiff's Database and Related

Testimony, Motion

for Summary

Judgment, Motion to Strike Portions of Plaintiff's Statement of Facts and
Motion to Strike Portions of the Declaration of Vicky Dewsnup and Related
Portions of Plaintiff's Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion
for Summary Judgment.

Also before the Court was the Plaintiff's Motion

for Partial Summary Judgment and Motion to Strike. At the conclusion of
the hearing, the Court took these various Motions under advisement for
further consideration of the relevant legal authorities, the parties'
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written submissions and counsel's oral argument.

Being now fully

informed, the Court rules as stated herein,
LEGAL ANALYSIS
At the outset, the Court notes that the parties' various Motions to
Strike are denied.

The Court has noted the procedural and evidentiary

objections advanced in these Motions, but declines to strike the matters
at issue.

Rather, the Court will consider these matters for what they

are worth, bearing in mind the objections made.
That brings the Court to the crux of the parties' arguments, as
raised in their respective Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and Motion
for Summary Judgment.

These Motions pertain to the Plaintiff's request

for permanent injunctive relief under the following claims:

(1) Utah

Uniform Trctde Secrets Act; (2) interference with current and prospective
economic

relationships;

(3) Federal

Computer

Fraud

and Abuse

Act

(*CFAA"); cind (4) the Utah Unfair Competition Act.
In seeking summary judgment, the Plaintiff asserts that based on the
undisputed facts, certain of the Defendants accessed its database while
in the scope of their employment with Eagle Gate and Provo College and
then used

this

information,

including

lead

lists, to recruit

Plaintiff's employees and/or to solicit prospective students.

the
The

Plaintiff maintains that injunctive relief is required in order to
prevent future incidents of the Defendants illegally accessing its
confidential database or using information already obtained.
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The Defendants, in turn, seek summary judgment on the basis that the
Plaintiff's claim for injunctive relief fails as matter of law because
there is no possible threat of ongoing or future harm.

With respect to

the Plaintiff's claims under the CFAA, the Defendants argue that based
on the Court's prior rulings concerning damages, this claim fails as a
matter of law.

The Defendants further argue that injunctive relief is

unavailable under the Unfair Competition Act.
After considering the parties' respective legal positions, the Court
agrees with the Defendants as to the Plaintiff's claim for injunctive
relief under the CFAA.

In light of the Court's prior rulings, the

Plaintiff cannot substantiate damages aggregating at least $5,000 in
value and therefore cannot meet the statutory threshold for bringing a
civil action under the CFAA.

Further, consistent with the Court's prior

observations, Ms. Dewsnup's general testimony concerning damages is not
sufficient in this regard.
The Court also agrees with the Defendants with respect to the Unfair
Competition Act.

Reading the plain language of the Act, it does not

appear that injunctive relief is provided for as a possible remedy under
the Act.

Accordingly, the Court grants the Defendants' Motion for

Summary Judgment as to the Plaintiff's claims for injunctive relief under
the CFAA and the Unfair Competition Act,
However, with respect to the Plaintiff's remaining claims for
injunctive relief, the Court is not convinced that the evidence clearly
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demonstrates that these claims are moot.
is moot when the

x

MEMORANDUM DECISION
n

The issue of injunctive relief

events make it absolutely clear the alleged wrongful

behavior could not reasonably be expected to recur.'" Modular Mining
Systems, Inc. v. Jigsaw Technologies, Inc., 2009 WL 1162893 (Ariz. App.
Div. 2) (quoting SAL Leasing, Inc. v. State ex. rel. Napolitano, 10 P.3d
1221, 1221

(Ariz. App. 2000)

(internal citations omitted)

(emphasis

added) . The Court is not persuaded that the facts in this case make it
^absolutely clear" that there exists no threat of future harm.

Instead,

the Court determines that this issue, as presented in this specific case,
is

factuaLly

intensive

and

warrants

a

trial

on

the

Plaintiff's

entitlement to injunctive relief. The record before the Court indicates
that some Level of improper access did occur previously.

The mere fact

that the employees who were involved in this activity were fired is not
sufficient for the Court to determine that the case has necessarily been
rendered moot, particularly where the future value of the information
obtained remains in dispute.
The Plaintiff's Motion likewise presents a set of factual issues,
particularly with respect to the scope of prior access, the value of the
information allegedly acquired, the extent of solicitation of prospective
students based on lead lists and the quality and value of the information
obtained for future purposes.
cannot determine summarily.

Again, these are matters that the Court
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Notably, in their Motion for Summary Judgment, the Defendants
suggest that the Plaintiff's claims fail simply because they cannot prove
damages (based on the Court's prior rulings) . At the same time, however,
the Defendants' Motion in Limine states that where the Plaintiff is
merely seeking injunctive relief, monetary damages are not relevant. In
that Motion, the Defendants correctly indicate that the Plaintiff *need
not show monetary damages to establish the need for an injunction rather, it must show the opposite: that it has suffered harm that is not
compensable by monetary damages or any other legal remedy."
The Court agrees that with the exception of the CFAA, which brings
the amount of damages to the forefront, the issue of damages with respect
to the Plaintiff's remaining claims is indeed irrelevant.
contrary

to the Defendants' argument

Therefore,

in their Motion for Summary

Judgment, the Plaintiff's inability to prove monetary damages does not
provide a basis for granting summary judgment with respect to its claims
for injunctive relief.

Rather, if the Plaintiff can meet the standard

concerning the threat of harm, for which it does not need to introduce
evidence of monetary damages, it can potentially succeed in its equitable
claims.
To summarize, the Court determines that there are a number of
factual issues in this case which preclude the Court from determining as
a matter of law whether or not injunctive relief is warranted in this
case.

Therefore, the Court denies the Plaintiff's Motion for Partial
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The Defendants' Motion for Summary

Judgment is granted in part and denied in part. Further, the Defendants'
Motion in Limine regarding evidence of monetary damages is granted.
Finally, as to the Defendants' remaining Motion in Limine, the Court
is unwilling to entirely exclude all login tracking lists, and related
evidence, that potentially show access of the Plaintiff's database by Ms.
Miller.

The Court is willing to consider an adverse inference as a

potential remedy for spoliation of evidence.

The scope and content of

this adverse inference will be addressed at the time of trial.

The

Defendants' Motion in Limine to exclude the login tracking lists is
denied.
This Memorandum Decision will stand as the Order of the Court.
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MAILING CERTIFICATE

I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the
foregoing Memorandum Decision, to the following, this
August, 2009:

Robert E. Mansfield
David P. Williams
Katherine Conyers
Attorneys for Plaintiff
15 W. South Temple, Suite 1200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Thomas R. Karrenberg
Nathan B, Wilcox
Jennifer R. Eshelman
Attorneys for Defendants Eagle Gate
College, Provo College, Horwitz and Miller
50 W. Broadway, Suite 700
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-2006
Nathan B. Wilcox
Attorney for Defendants
201 S. Main Street, Thirteenth Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Wallace Rogers
4376 South 2675 West
Roy, Utah 84067
Mark N. Brian
Attorney for Defendants Iongi and Smith
P.O. Box 173
Spanish Fork, Utah 84660
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